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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ultimately, this case is about a business transaction gone awry, leading to
Mr. Bennett being imprisoned for an alleged breach of contract. However, the State
contends that this is a theft because Mr. Bennett was not entitled to take the trailer from
the property which Mr. Bennett had asked Mr. LeFave to bring the trailer.

(See

Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State argues that Mr. Bennett was not allowed to move
the trailer from Ms. Ellinger's property, where Mr. LeFave had locked up the trailer, until
Mr. Bennett had paid for the trailer.

(Repondents' Brief, p.7.) Because Mr. Bennett

moved the trailer without Mr. LeFave's knowledge or consent and without paying in full
or returning the trailer, the State asserts that it provided sufficient evidence to convict
Mr. Bennett of theft. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.)
This Reply is necessary to address the following arguments made by the State:
First, the State argues that the broader policy against imprisonment for debt recognized
in State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 642, 945 P.2d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 1997) is not
applicable to this case because this case is factually different and, unlike Mr. Henninger,
Mr. Bennett was charged with general theft. This assertion is incorrect because the
Idaho State Constitution expressly prohibits imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt
and the policy expressed in Henninger and as well as other Idaho cases against
imprisonment for debt is clearly applicable to this case. Second, the State asserts that it
demonstrated that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the property, because Mr. Bennett took
the trailer off Ms. Elligner's property without Mr. LeFave's permission; however, the
State still failed to demonstrate how any taking by Mr. Bennett was wrongful because
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the trailer was already in Mr. Bennett's possession.

Finally, the State argued that it

demonstrated that Mr. Bennett possessed the requisite intent to not pay for the trailer by
providing evidence that Mr. Bennett moved the trailer and eventually did not finish
paying for the trailer or return the trailer. Mr. Bennett contends that, despite the State's
assertions otherwise, it failed to prove that at the time Mr. Bennett took the trailer he
possessed the requisite intent.
Mr. Bennett refers this Court to the Appellant's Brief for his arguments regarding
the remaining issues addressed by the State.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Bennett's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdict finding
Mr. Bennett guilty of Grand Theft?
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ARGUMENT
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The JUry'S Verdict Finding
Mr. Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft

A.

Introd uction
In response to Mr. Bennett's argument on appeal that the State failed to provide

sufficient evidence to support his conviction, the State argues that Mr. Bennett was not
allowed to move the trailer from Ms. Ellinger's property, where Mr. LeFave had locked
up the trailer, until Mr. Bennett had paid for it.

(Repondents' Brief, p.7.)

Because

Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without Mr. LeFave's knowledge or consent and without
paying in full or returning the trailer, the State asserts that it has provided sufficient
evidence to convict Mr. Bennett of theft.

(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State also

argues that the broader policy against imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt outlined
in State v. Henninger 130 Idaho 638,642,945 P.2d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 1997), does not
apply to this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.)
Mr. Bennett contends that the policy against imprisonment for failure to pay a
debt absolutely applies in his case and his conviction for general theft for failing to pay
for the property as agreed is exactly what this policy was designed to prevent.
Mr. Bennett also contends that the State's argument that by providing evidence that
Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without Mr. LeFave's consent, it provided sufficient
evidence that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the property in question is incorrect because
the was already in Mr. Bennett's possession and you cannot wrongfully take something
you already posses. Finally, the State's argument that it demonstrated that Mr. Bennett
possessed the requisite intent at the time he took the trailer also fails because the
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evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Mr. Bennett had recently paid and still
intended to make payments on the trailer after it was moved.

B.

The Broader Policy Arguments Against Imprisonment For The Failure To Pay For
A Debt Are Applicable To Mr. Bennett's Conviction For Grand Theft Because He
Was Essentially Convicted For The Failure To Pay A Debt
In the Appellant's Brief, prior to discussing each of the missing elements

individually, Mr. Bennett explained the general policy against enforcing contract
disputes through criminal proceedings and explained that, by being charged not with
some type of fraudulent theft, but with general theft, his case was directly at odds with
Idaho Const art I, § 15 and this policy. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) To support this
argument, Mr. Bennett cited language from State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 642, 945
P.2d 864 868 (Ct. App. 1997), as well as other Idaho cases discussing this policy.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.)

In the Respondent's Brief, the State argues that the

broader policy discussions outlined in Henninger do not apply to this case because
Henninger dealt with the failure to make a payment on a secured transaction and noting

"[W]here, as here, the prosecution 'is intended to deter and to punish actions prohibited
by statute,' 'it is a proper exercise of criminal law.' (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.)
However, this argument by the State ignQres Article I, section 15, of the Idaho
State Constitution which expressly prohibits "imprisonment for debt in this state except
in cases of fraud." Idaho Const. art I, § 15. Although, at one time, imprisonment for

failure to pay a debt was an acceptable "private civil remedy," as explained by the South
Dakota Supreme Court, it quickly became disfavored in the nineteen century. State v.
Allison, 607 N.W.2d 1, 3 (S.D. 2000).

By 1853, the United State's Supreme Court

stated

5

Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. It has
descended with the stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a
remedy. It is a right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit
of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and
dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it
is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when
such a blot is removed from the statute-book.
Id. (quoting Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 281,302 (1853)). Today,

imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt is often forbidden by state constitutional
provisions like Idaho Const. art I, § 15. Id. Such provisions are designed to protect the
debtor who cannot pay from imprisonment, but also allow for the prosecution of those
who act fraudulently or dishonestly. Id. (quoting State v. Madewell, 309 A.2d 201, 204
(1973)}.
Therefore, historically, courts have been reluctant to apply criminal culpability to
a civil breach of a contract.

See State v. Hersch, 445 N.W.2d 626, 633 n.10 (N.D.

1989) (stating that a false promise may not be inferred merely from nonperformance of
a promise because "the crime of theft of property was not intended as a substitute for a
breach of contract suit.") (citing Coment on Theft of Property Offenses: § 1731-1741,
Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol
2, p.925 (1970)); Wojahn v. Halder, 39 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1949) (noting that although
imprisonment for debt is forbidden by the Minnesota State constitution, imprisonment for
fraud in contracting a debt was acceptable stating "[t]he imprisonment in such case is
for the fraud and not for the debt"); State v. Ripley, 889 So.2d 1214 (La. Ct. App. 2 nd Cir.
2004) (stating "[t]his case is essentially a civil breach of contract case arising out of the
failure to pay rent.

It is paramount that criminal intent, one of the several essential

elements the state must prove for the crime of theft, be clearly established by the
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evidence" when finding the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's
conviction); State v. Amanns, 2 S.w.3d 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding although the
evidence presented by the State established a breach of contract, the defendants
conduct failed "to establish the commission of any offense recognized under our general
theft statute."); Evans v. State, 508 SO.2d 1205 (Ala. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that
although the defendant's conduct constituted a breach of contract, it did not constitute
the crime of theft by deception). See also Commonweatlh v. Hensley, 375 S.E.2d 182
(Va. Ct. App. 1988) ("[W)hile there was no explicit proscription in Virginia's Constitution
against imprisonment for debt, it nevertheless was clear that a person could not be
imprisoned, absent fraud, for mere failure to pay a debt arising from a contract.");
People v. Ryan, 363 N.E. 2d 334, 337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977) (cautioning against

expanding the scope of criminal liability for larceny by false pretenses because there
was always a danger that the crime could reach into the civil realm of a mere breach of
contract and stating, "the inference of intent must overcome to a moral certainty an
implication of mere civil wrong.") Id.
Much like under the Idaho Constitution, under the Washington State Constitution,
"one cannot be imprisoned merely for failure to pay a debt," although it is acceptable to
imprison for fraud. State v. Pike, 826 P .2d 152, 157 (Wash. 1992). In State v. Pike, the
Washington Supreme Court stated that "general contractual debt cannot support a theft
conviction" noting that "[w)e are loath to turn the criminal justice system into a
mechanism for the collection of private debts." Id. See also State v. Sloan, 903 P.2d
522 (Wash.App. Div 3 1995) ("[B)reach of contract without more does not support
criminal liability.").
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In Louisiana, the courts have specifically held that "a defendant lacks the
requisite intent [to commit theft] when he makes an effort to pay the victim or to honor a
promise made to him." State v. Saucier, 485 So.2d 584, 585 (La. App. 1986.) In
Saucier, the defendant had been given the victim's dog to breed. 'd. When it became

apparent that no dogs would be bred, she stated that she would pay for the dog, but
never actually paid. She asserted that by attempting to bred the dog, she established
that she intended to fulfill her obligations and that her failure to pay may give rise to a
civil suit for breach of contract, but was not criminal theft. 'd. The Louisiana Court of
Appeals agreed. 'd.
Similarly, in Cox v. State, 658 SW.2d 668 (Tx. App. 1983), the Texas Court of
Appeals also found that the evidence established nothing more than a contract dispute,
stating "[t]he mere fact that one fails to return or pay back money after failing to perform
a contract, for the performance of which the money was paid in advance, does not
constitute theft." 'd. at 671. In Cox, the alleged victim contracted with the defendant to
have some home repair work done, paying the defendant in advance for parts and
services. 'd. at 669-670. The alleged victim admitted that the defendant performed "a
great deal of the services" he said he would, but did not complete the job or return any
of the money.

'd. at 670. The court found that ''the evidence in the present case

established no more than a dispute over appellant's performance of a kitchen
remodeling contract." 'd. at 671. The court went on to find that the State failed to
establish that the defendant had the intent to deprive the alleged victim at the time he
took the money from her. 'd.
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Like many of the other States cited above, the Idaho Constitutional provision
prohibiting imprisonment for failure to pay a debt specifically creates an exception for
cases of fraud. See Id. Const. art I, § 15. However, Mr. Bennett was not charged with
any type of fraudulent theft involving misrepresentation or misappropriation of the
property, but was charged with general theft for moving the trailer before making all of
the payments. Therefore, despite the State's--assertions otherwise, Mr. Bennett was
charged and convicted of theft for his failure to fulfill his contractual obligations, which is
what Idaho Const. art I § 15 was designed to prevent.

C.

There Was Not Substantial Competent Evidence To Conclude That Mr. Bennett
Wrongfully Took The Property, Because The Property Was Already Lawfully In
His Possession
In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bennett argued he could not have wrongfully taken

the trailer when he moved it because it was already in his possession.

(Appellant's

Brief, pp.13-14.) Mr. Bennett argued that once Mr. LeFave dropped off the trailer at
Ms. Elliger's property, the trailer was in Mr. Bennett's possession and was under his
control to live in, to care for, etc. The State argues that because Mr. LeFave stat~d he
placed a lock on the trailer hitch and told Mr. Bennett not to move the trailer without
notifying him, the wrongful taking occurred when Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without
Mr. LeFave's permission. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) However, this argument still
ignores the fact Mr. Bennett could not wrongfully take the trailer because it was already
in his possession and you cannot wrongfully take property that is lawfully in your
possession. See Henninger, 130 Idaho at 641,945 P.2d at 867. Therefore, the State
failed to demonstrate that Mr. Bennett's taking of the vehicle was wrongful.
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D.

The State Failed To Prove That Mr. Bennett Wrongfully Took The Trailer With
The Intent To Deprive The Owner Of The Property Or To Appropriate The
Property
Finally, and probably most importantly, the State failed to prove that Mr. Bennett

wrongfully took the trailer with the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to
appropriate the property.

The State argues that it has demonstrated that when

Mr. Bennett took the property from Ms. Ellinger's property, he intended to permanently
deprive Mr. LeFave of the property, "a point best illustrated by Bennett's own threat to
'burn [the trailer].'"

(Repondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) However this argument is flawed

because Mr. Bennett made a payment shortly before moving the trailer to Washington
and again later offered to send payment to Mr. LeFave after he had moved the trailer to
Washington; therefore, the State failed to demonstrate at the time the trailer was moved
Mr. Bennett intended to deprive Mr. Bennett of the payment he was entitled to on the
trailer.
As Professor LeFave has noted, the defendant's conduct and his mental state
must coincide for a larceny or theft to be completed. Wayne R. LeFave, Substantive
Criminal Law, § 19.5(f) (2 nd ed. 2003.) Thus, the taking and the intent to steal must
concur or occur at the same time. Id. ("[O]ne who finds lost or mislaid property and
picks it up intending to return it to the owner, but who later decides to steal it, cannot be
guilty of larceny; for the taking and asportation, on the one hand, and the intent to steal
on the other, do not coincide.")

Likewise, the Idaho Courts have also stated that the

intent required to deprive the owner of his property "must exist at the time of the
wrongful taking or stealing." State v. Bassett, 86 Idaho 277, 385 P.2d 246 (1963). See
also Jesser, 95 Idaho at 51,501 P.2d at 735. Therefore, at the time Mr. Bennett took
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the property, which according to the State was when it was moved from Ms. Ellinger's
property, Mr. Bennett had to possess the requisite intent to deprive Mr. LeFave.
Here, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Bennett possessed the
intent to deprive Mr. LeFave of the payment he was due under the contract at the time
he moved the trailer. According to Ms. Ellinger, the trailer was placed on her property,
after she gave Mr. Bennett permission to do so, in October/November and a month or
two later, the trailer was moved. (Tr., p.B2, L.16 - p.B4, L.2.) Mr. LeFave only testified
that he received a call stating the trailer was not at the property anymore and he went to
investigate and several months later Mr. Bennett called. (Tr., p.32, L.10 - p.33, L.11.)
It was after that call that Mr. LeFave sent Mr. Bennett the demand letter. (Tr., p.33,
Ls.9-11, p.34, Ls.5-B.) Likewise, Mrs. LeFave remembered receiving a payment from
Mr. Bennett, but could not remember when, stating "The fall. That's about the extent of
what I remember." (Tr., p.73, Ls.19-22.) Notably, Mr. LeFave admitted that Mr. Bennett
did offer to pay for the trailer when he called requesting the title. (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3; p.39,
Ls.10-20.)
Mr. Bennett's testimony also failed to demonstrate his intent to deprive
Mr. LeFave. According to Mr. Bennett, the payment to Mrs. LeFave was made on
November 17, 2004. (Tr., p.101, Ls.10-23.) Additionally, Mr. Bennett testified that he
had already moved the trailer to a new location, with Mr. LeFave, prior to dropping off
the money to Mrs. LeFave, and he moved to Washington immediately after giving the
money to Mrs. LeFave. (Tr., p.111, L.22 - p.113, L.B.) He also testified that he called
Mr. LeFave from Washington asking for the title on December 20, 2004, well after he
had moved to Washington. (Tr., p.115, Ls.1-7.) Therefore, the State's evidence failed
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to prove that Mr. Bennett had the intent to steal the trailer and not continue to make
payments, at the time he took the trailer.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand
theft with a persistent violator enhancement because there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction. Alternatively, he requests that this Court order that his judgment
and commitment order be corrected to properly reflect a single sentence, rather than
separate concurrent sentences for grand theft and persistent violator.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2008.

ARLSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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